التقرير الأسبوعي لمراكز الأبحاث الاميركية

الإثنين 6 حزيران 2011 - 6:35 ص

10201

دولية

في قسم التحليل المرفق، نتناول مسألة تجاهلتها معظم مراكز الابحاث وهي تعيين الجنرال ديمبسي كرئيس لقيادة القوات المشتركة وصعوده لمنصب المستشار العسكري الرئيسي لاوباما. كما يتناول التحليل تعيين الجنرال ديفيد بترايوس كمدير لوكالة الاستخبارات المركزية الاميركية وما ينطوي عليه من تباينات في التوجهات السياسية بحكم خبرته الميدانية داخل طاقم مستشاري الأمن القومي.

_________________________________________________________

علق معهد بحوث السياسة الخارجية Foreign Policy Research Institute على طريقة ادارة حلف الناتو للعمليات العسكرية ضد ليبيا قائلا "بعد ارسال القوات البحرية الخاصة لاغتيال بن لادن، هل يعد ذلك مؤشرا على امكانية التعامل مع القذافي باطلاق العنان لشراسة المحامين في لاهاي؟ ربما يعد ذلك ضربا من الخيال. اذ من المستبعد ان تؤدي غارات الناتو الجوية لتسليم القذافي لمحكمة الجنايات الدولية. لكن تصريح المدعي العام للمحكمة الدولية يؤكد على الخصائص المميزة لحملة الناتو. ويمكننا القول انها الاشتباك العسكري الاول – الذي يتم اشراك اطراف غربية اساسية بالتأكيد – خيض تحت مظلة الاشراف القانوني لمحكمة الجنايات الدولية. ولعل الدور الخفي الذي تلعبه المحكمة الدولية يفسر اجراءات ضبط النفس الغير عادية التي اظهرها الناتو في ادائه. وكان من الممكن ان يقدم اي طرف من اطراف الناتو الاساسيين (الولايات المتحدة وبريطانيا وفرنسا) على استخدام حق النقض للقرار الاممي لكنهم ارتأوا الاحتفال بدعوة التدخل للمدعي العام الدولي."

وتناول معهد هدسون Hudson Institute طبيعة الاحتياجات التي يتطلبها المتمردون في ليبيا، متسائلا لماذا لم تقدم الولايات المتحدة على توفير دعم اكبر لهم. وقال "باستطاعة نحو ستة طائرات نقل ضخمة من طراز C-130 (حمولة كل منها 72،000 رطل) ايصال المعدات غير القتالية لنحو 2،000 جندي، استنادا الى مصادر سلاح الجو. فالليبيون لديهم الارادة، والمجلس الوطني الانتقالي الحاكم لليبيا الحرة قد عرض مسألة تعويض حلف الناتو بعائدات نفطية مستقبلية لقاء الدعم. (وبما ان الولايات المتحدة لم تفرج عن الاصول والعوائد المجمدة التابعة للقذافي لصالح حكومة ليبيا الحرة، فانهم غير قادرين على شراء المعدات انفسهم). بل ان السؤال الاهم هو لماذا لا تقدم الولايات المتحدة على تزويد المقاتلين الليبيين ببنادق هجومية واسلحة ثقيلة من شأنها اعطاب دبابات القذافي. فالعالم العربي يراقب تطورات هذه الحرب على قناة الجزيرة ليليا، وسيتذكر الاطراف التي قدمت دعما لفظيا من نقيضه للديمقراطيات الوليدة في بلدان اسلامية."

اما الاوضاع في سورية فكانت من نصيب المركز المؤيد للوبي الصهيوني، معهد واشنطن Washington Institute ، الذي طرح تصورات وردية تخدم الاجندة الصهيونية مراهنا على دور الولايات المتحدة في التخطيط لمرحلة ما بعد الأسد في سورية. وقال "يتعين على الولايات المتحدة ان تعيد ترتيب اولوياتها بما يخص سورية بدل التركيز على مسار العملية السلمية الى تناول الشؤون الداخلية السورية. اذ ولغاية بضعة اسابيع خلت، اعتمدت استراتيجية الولايات المتحدة لسورية على ما سينتج عن معاهدة سلام سورية-اسرائيلية، بشكل كبير، مما سيتطلب من الاسد الغاء علاقاته مع ايران وحزب الله. وحاليا، يتعين على واشنطن التركيز على الاتيان بحكومة تتصدرها الاغلبية السنية في البلاد، والتي من شأنها خلق توتر كبير مع او قطع التحالف بين سورية وايران الشيعية."

كما وادلى بدلوه في الاوضاع الليبية والسورية مجلس العلاقات الخارجية، Council on Foreign Relations، قائلا "ان عددا من الخبراء يطالبون اتخاذ مواقف اشد صرامة، خاصة ضد ليبيا وسورية. لقد تعرض نظام القذافي لضربة جديدة بعد فرار ثمانية من القيادات العسكرية الاساسية. وفي اليمن، انضم لواء من قوات الحرس الجمهوري الى قوات المعارضة في الجنوب، على الرغم من انهيار اتفاق وقف اطلاق النار بين الحكومة واتباع شيخ اكبر عشيرة، حميد الاحمر. لكن في سورية، التي يقال ان ظهور فيديو بشع لجثة تعود لطفل يبلغ من العمر ثلاثة عشر عاما تم تعذيبه من قبل القوات الحكومية قد اشعل نيران الغضب، بينما تستمر حكومة بشار الاسد في مهاجمة المتظاهرين."

اما صندوق جيرمان مارشال، German Marshall Fund، وهو مؤسسة بحثية معنية بتنسيق السياسات الاميركية والاوروبية المختلفة، فقد اعرب عن تشاؤمه من امكانية حدوث تغيير حقيقي في مصر. واعرب في دراسة اصدرها مؤخرا عن اعتقاده بان مصر لا تزال تعاني من استبدادية مركزية جديدة ، رغم اقراره بأن نهاية عهد مبارك قد تؤدي لمرحلة سياسية انتقالية تفضي لاعادة اصطفاف التحالف الحاكم او اجراء تعديلات في ميزان القوى الداخلي والدولي. واردف، بغض النظر الى ما ستسفر عنه الهوية المصرية، كدولة تحظى بالتأييد، فان الامر متروك للمستقبل. ومضى بالقول ان جزء من هدف الدراسة هو تحديد بعض المعوقات لهذه النتيجة المبتغاة.

بينما تناولت مؤسسة هاريتاج اليمينية، Heritage Foundation، قضية تخفيض الميزانية الدفاعية الشائكة في ظل عصر يتسم بمستويات عجز عالية. وقالت: في معالجة أزمة عجز الديون المركزية، يتعين على الكونغرس التحلي بالعناية الخاصة لعدم تخفيض ميزانية الدفاع لمستويات قد تحد من هيبة القوات المسلحة وقدرتها على ثني وردع الخصم، وان تطلبت الحاجة هزيمة الخصوم المستقبليين. بما ان الولايات المتحدة اقدمت على تخفيضات كبرى في المشتريات الدفاعية حين تراجعت التهديدات، فانها تواجه راهنا عددا متنوعا ومثير للقلق من تحديات الأمن القومي تتراوح بين القراصنة الصوماليين الى المنظمات الارهابية متعددة الجنسيات الى دول مارقة بحوزتها اسلحة نووية. ان افضل مجالات الاستثمارات للولايات المتحدة هو في القدرات الدفاعية التي باستطاعتها ثني وردع خصوم المستقبل.

التحليل:

دلالات تعيين قائد جديد لقيادة الأركان المشتركة:

استهل الرئيس اوباما مناسبة العطلة الرسمية للاعلان عن خياره بترشيح الجنرال مارتن ديمبسي كرئيس لقياد اركان القوات المشتركة، الأمر الذي يتطلب مصادقة الكونغرس عليه لاحقا. كما واجرى اوباما تعديلات وتنقلات اخرى في قيادات الدفاع والأمن القومي.

ويشغل ديمبسي حاليا موقع الممثل لقوات الجيش في قيادة الاركان؛ وسيحل محله الجنرال ريه اديرنو؛ وسيشغل مركز نائب الرئيس الادميرال جيمس وينفلد المسؤول عن قيادة القوات الشمالية.

ويمثل اختيار اوباما لهؤلاء المؤيدين بشدة للحرب على العراق تعارضا مع وعوده الانتخابية بأن الحرب في افغانستان هي "حرب ارادية." اذ شغل ديمبسي موقع القائد الاعلى المسؤول عن تشكيل القوات الأمنية الانتقالية في العراق بين عامي 2005-2007، ليتسلم بعدها موقع نائب رئيس القيادة المركزية قبل انهماكه لمدة ثلاثة اعوام في تأسيس قيادة التدريب والنظرية. اما الجنرال اوديرنو فهو من اشد المؤيدين للهجوم على العراق وشغل موقع القائد العام للقوات الاميركية هناك، ويعد واحدا ممن وضعوا استراتيجية الطفرة "زيادة القوات" في العراق التي عارضها اوباما بشدة.

وفي الفترة التي عمل بها ديمبسي في العراق، تسلم القيادة الميدانية لقوات اطلق عليها "مهمة القوة الحديدية" التي اعتبرت من اكبر التشكيلات القيادية على مستوى الفرقة في تاريخ الجيش الاميركي.

وكانت مهمة ديمبسي محصورة في نطاق عمليات قاطع بغداد في زمن تصاعد المقاومة المسلحة ضد الاحتلال، وبسط الثوار سيطرتهم على مدينة الفلوجة؛ وكان ينظر لادائه من قبل المعنيين في واشنطن بأنه يواجه وضعا قاسيا بنجاح.

ومنذ ذلك التاريخ شغل ديمبسي مركز القيادة الاول في في قيادة القوات المركزية، التي يقع الشرق الاوسط من ضمن نطاق عملياتها.

وفاجأ اوباما الاوساط العسكرية بترشيحه ديمبسي وهي التي كانت تعول على ترشيح قائد قوات المارينز الجنرال جيمس كترايت، الذي يتمتع بعلاقة وثيقة باوباما. وتجدر الاشارة الى ان اداء كترايت بتقديم النصائح العسكرية العملياتية والاستراتيجية لاوباما والمغايرة لتصورات البنتاغون قد اكسبته عداء العديد من القيادات بما فيها وزير الدفاع غيتس؛ اذ من العرف ان يتم تقديم النصائح للرئيس عبر التسلسل العسكري القيادي.

وتجدر الاشارة الى ان قوات المارينز تاريخيا تعير الاولوية من اهتماماتها لطبيعة القائد على حساب التقنية الحديثة، بينما كان كترايت من انصار الاستفادة من القدرات االتقنية، في حين التزم ديمسبي النظرة التقليدية وهي ايلاء مسألة القيادة الاهمية القصوى؛ الامر الذي يعزو اختياره في ظل ظروف خفض ميزانيات البنتاغون. ويؤشر اختياره الى ان تاريخه في دعم التدخل العسكري وتصعيده يقود الى القول بأنه من غير المرجح ان يطالب بتخفيض حجم القوات الاميركية في كل من العراق وافغانستان.

اما صلاحيات قائد قيادة الاركان فهي لا تتضمن مسؤولية القيادة العملية، بخلاف ما كان سابقا، التي وافق عليها الكونغرس عام 1986. ومنذ ذلك الحين اضحت المراتيبية القيادية هي من الرئيس الى وزير الدفاع، الذي يقوم بدوره بايصال الاوامر الى قادة التشكيلات القتالية.

اما الجنرال باتريوس، المتوقع مصادقة الكونغرس على ترشيحه لادارة وكالة الاستخبارات المركزية دون عناء كبير، يعد متميزا في اداءه خاصة في شن الحرب المضادة للتمرد، لا سيما انجازه في العراق وفي الموصل تحديدا. وفي اعقاب تسلمه منصب قائد القوات المركزية، بعد ديمبسي، اطلق عليه البعض انه أتى بحلول لمشاكل سببها ديمبسي.

وبالنتيجة هناك رؤيتين متباينتين تطبعان توجهات مستشاري الامن القومي للاستمرار في الحرب في الشرق الاوسط: نظرة باتريوس التي تعتمد على مكافحة التمرد بتشكيلات صغيرة؛ ونظرة ديمبسي التي تعتمد على الرؤية التقليدية لادارة الحرب. وبالنظر الى سمعة باتريوس الطيبة في اوساط العسكريين والسياسيين على السواء، فان ديمبسي قد يواجه العديد من الازمات اكبر مما كان يتوقعه.

ومن المتوقع ان تستعر الخلافات وتباين الاراء عند طرح مسألة تمديد العمل باتفاقية بقاء القوات الاميركية في العراق (SOFA) قريبا، اذ ان النص الحالي للاتفاقية يقضي برحيل القوات الاميركية مع نهاية العام الجاري. ومما لا شك فيه ان الاتفاقية تمس قضايا حساسة للطرفين الموقعين، مما يتطلب اتخاذ اجراء ما في القريب العاجل.

وعند هذا المفصل بالتحديد قد نشهد نزاعا بين رؤيتي ديمبسي وباتريوس لمستقبل الاتفاقية. اذ يتواجد نحو 47،000 جندي نظامي في العراق والذين سيشملهم الانسحاب، الى جانب نحو 63،000 من المتعاقدين، واغلاق نحو 100 قاعدة عسكرية والتخلص من نحو مليون قطعة من المعدات العسكرية. ومن المسلم به ان رؤية البنتاغون للاوضاع تقر بضرورة تواجد بعض القوات الاميركية هناك؛ وعند التوصل الى اتفاقية ما قبل نهاية العام الجاري فسيكون لكل من ديمبسي وباتريوس دور اساسي في تحديد حجم ونطاق عمل القوات المتبقية.

وبالنظر الى خلفياتهما المتباينة، فان طبيعة القوات المتبقية سيكون مثار للجدل داخل طاقم الأمن القومي. اذ قد يدفع ديمبسي باتجاه بقاء قوات مدرعة كبيرة لعام 2012 وما بعده. وبما ان انسحاب القوات المدرعة ينطوي على عقبات لوجستية جمة، فقد يستقر الرأي على بقائها لحل الازمة اللوجستية والكلفة الاجمالية معا، مع العلم ان استخدام القوة المدرعة في مسرح حرب المدن سيحد من الدور الذي يمكن ان تؤديه.

من المرجح ان يدفع باتريوس باتجاه وجود خفيف للمشاة للقيام بمهام القتال داخل المدن العراقية، وسيكون طرحه اكثر عدوانية في العراق لما بعد عام 2012؛ كما وان توظيف قوات المشاة في المسرح الافغاني، من وجهة نظره، سيتم بصورة افضل ان تطلب الامر.

وكما شأن العراق، يشكل التعامل مع افغانستان تباين في وجهتي النظر بينهما ايضا. وبما ان باتريوس شغل منصب القائد العام للقوات الاميركية وقوات الناتو هناك، وبدعم من وزير الدفاع اضحى القائد الميداني ايضا. ولان طبيعة افغانستان تتطلب قوات مشاة خفيفة فان باتريوس يمتلك ميزة اضافية لازداء النصح.

مما لا شك فيه ان اوباما يرغب في تخفيض عدد القوات في عام 2012 لتتزامن مع حملة الانتخابات الرئاسية؛ وعليه تجنب الحذر ودرء الصدام مع باتريوس ونصائحه، وهو المفضل بين الساسة والعسكر على السواء، الذي يرى ان افغانستان تتطلب عددا اكبر من القوات القتالية لمساعدة القوات الافغانية. وبالمجمل، فان تخفيض حجم القوات سيتم طرحه بانه انجاز كبير وهام دون التخلي عن سياسة ما يعرف بالحملة المضادة للتمرد.

Executive Summary

Thanks to Memorial Day Weekend, this was a quiet week in the think tank community. Since this holiday traditionally represents the beginning of the summer vacation period, the number of think tank papers being produced will be less over the next three months.

Events quieted down with the departure of the Israeli prime minister. As a result, the subject of the papers was more varied than in the past few weeks.

Our analysis this week looks at a subject not broached by other think tanks – the appointment of General Dempsey to the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We look at this man who is due to become the senior uniformed officer in the military and senior military advisor to Obama. We also look at the weaknesses in this position and speculate that the future Director of the CIA, current General Petraeus, may have a different view of the conflicts in the region and may spark policy disagreements within the national security leadership.

The Foreign Policy Research Institute looks at the way NATO is carrying out operations in Libya. They note, “Having sent Navy SEALs to kill bin Laden, do we propose to deal with Gaddafi by unleashing fierce lawyers at the Hague? But perhaps that is too fanciful. It is not likely that NATO air strikes will deliver Gaddafi into the custody of the ICC. Still, the ICC Prosecutor’s announcement underscores one of the exceptional features of NATO’s campaign. It is arguably the first military conflict—certainly the first fought by the leading participants from the West—fought under the legal supervision of the International Criminal Court. The ICC’s role in the background may explain the extraordinary restraint so far shown by NATO in its conduct of this conflict. Any one of the leading NATO powers (the United States, Britain and France) could have vetoed that resolution but they all welcomed the intervention of the international prosecutor.”

The Hudson Institute looks at what aid the Libyan rebels need. They ask why the US hasn’t done more to help. They note, “About six U.S. C-130 military transport aircraft (capacity: 72,000 pounds each) could deliver nonlethal equipment for 2,000 soldiers, according to an Air Force source. The Libyans have the will, and the National Transitional Council governing Free Libya has offered to repay NATO out of future oil revenues for the means. (Because the U.S. hasn't released frozen Gadhafi assets to the free Libyan government, they have been unable to purchase supplies themselves.) A larger question is why the U.S. doesn't provide the Libyan freedom fighters with assault rifles and heavy weapons that could do real damage to Gadhafi's tanks. The Arab world is watching this war on Al Jazeera every night. They will remember whose support for the emerging Muslim democracies was empty rhetoric, and whose was real.”

As demonstrations continue in Syria, the Washington Institute advancing their wishful thinking to serve Israeli agenda looks at how the US should plan for a post Assad Syria. They note, “The U.S. government's list of priorities regarding Syria needs to be switched from an emphasis on the peace process to one centered on domestic Syrian affairs. Until a few weeks ago, Washington based its Syria strategy almost wholly on the conclusion of a Syria-Israel peace treaty that would require Assad to break off relations with Iran and Hezbollah. Now, Washington should focus on bringing about a government led by the country's Sunni majority, which would naturally create considerable tension with or a break in Syria's alliance with Shiite-dominated Iran.”

The Council on Foreign Relations also weighs in on events in Libya and Syria. They note, “A number of experts are calling for an even tougher stand, particularly against Libya and Syria. The Qaddafi regime suffered a new blow with the defections of eight senior military officers. In Yemen, a brigade of the Republican Guard defected to the opposition in the south, although a ceasefire collapsed between the government and followers of the country's main tribal leader, Hamid al-Ahmar. However, in Syria, where a reportedly gruesome video of the corpse of a thirteen-year-old boy who was tortured by government forces has galvanized rage, the government of Bashar al-Assad has continued to attack protestors.”

The German Marshall Fund is pessimistic about real change in Egypt. The authors of the paper still consider Egypt a neo-authoritarian state for all practical purposes, although they acknowledge that the end of the Mubarak era might lead to a political transition in terms of a ruling coalition reshuffle or adjustments in the domestic and international balance of power. Whether Egypt will become a more representative country, however, still remains to be seen. Part of the aim of this work is to highlight some of the possible obstacles to this desirable outcome.

The Heritage Foundation looks at the prickly problem of defense cutbacks in this period of high deficits. They say that in confronting the federal debt crisis, Congress should take special care not to cut the defense budget in ways that would reduce the U.S. military’s ability to dissuade, deter, and, if necessary, defeat future adversaries. While America has made significant cuts to defense spending before when threats receded, today the U.S. faces a disturbingly diverse set of national security challenges ranging from Somali pirates to transnational terrorist organizations to rogue nations with nuclear weapons. One of the best investments the U.S. can make is in military capabilities that dissuade and deter future adversaries.

ANALYSIS

What the New Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Means

On Memorial Day, Obama announced his choice of General Martin Dempsey as the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Along with the other changes on the JCS, this completed Obama’s major reshuffling of the defense and national security leadership. Dempsey currently sits on the Joint Chiefs as the Army’s representative. General Ray Odierno, will take his place, and Admiral James Winnefeld moves from running the US Northern Command to vice chair.

Given his campaign rhetoric about the “War of choice”, it’s surprising that Obama has chosen two men so closely associated with the war in Iraq, though. Dempsey was the overall commander of the multi-national force’s Security Transition Force from 2005-7, which developed and trained the new Iraqi security forces, moving from there to deputy commander of CENTCOM and later a brief stint as acting commander before spending the next three years as the commander of the Training and Doctrine Command. Odierno is even more closely associated with Iraq, having commanded all US forces there, and is generally considered one of the key architects of the 2007 “surge” strategy that Barack Obama vociferously rejected as a Senator and presidential candidate.

This marks a fast advancement in the ranks. Just ten years ago, Dempsey was a colonel. He received his first star in August 2001. He was promoted to Major General in 2004, Lieutenant General in 2005, and General in 2008. When he becomes Chairman of the JCS, he will be the senior uniformed officer.

Given his role in fighting an unconventional war, it is surprising that Dempsey is a product of the Armor branch of the US Army. He served as the Commanding Officer of the 4th Battalion 67th Armor in Friedberg Germany. He went on to be the Executive Officer of the 3rd Brigade 3rd Armored Division during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. He then commanded the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment as a Colonel. In June 2003, he assumed command of 1st Armored Division. Dempsey commanded 1st Armored Division until July 2005 including 13 months in Iraq from June 2003 to July 2004. While in Iraq, had operational command over the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment and a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division; the command, called "Task Force Iron" in recognition of the 1^st Armored Division's nickname, "Old Ironsides", was the largest division-level command in the history of the United States Army.

It was during this time that the U.S. intervention in Iraq changed dramatically as Fallujah fell to rebels and supporters of Muqtada Sadr built their strength and rose up against American forces. Dempsey and his command assumed responsibility for the Area of Operations in Baghdad as the resistance to occupation grew. General Dempsey was generally seen by Washington circles as handling a difficult (and inherited) job well, under the global spotlight on Baghdad.

Since then, Dempsey has headed CENTCOM, which is operationally in charge of operations in the Middle East. He later took command of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command. Just two months ago, he became Army Chief of Staff.

Dempsey was a bit of a surprise as Obama’s choice since many accepted that the Marine Corps General James Cartwright would be the new Chair of the JCS, given his close relationship with Obama. Cartwright had made enemies in the Pentagon for providing independent advice to Obama on operations and strategy. The military, however, relies on the chain of command for providing advice and his actions outside of the chain of command had damaged his reputation, especially with outgoing Secretary of Defense Gates.

Obama might have still opted for Cartwright except for some questionable relationships with a junior female on his staff. This would have been brought up during his Senate Hearings and would have complicated what Obama had hoped would be smooth confirmation hearings for his choices.

Ironically although the US Marine Corps traditionally relies on leadership over technology, General Cartwright was a strong advocate of technology, while Dempsey is seen as focusing on leadership. Given the great possibility of cutbacks in Pentagon spending, a focus on leadership may very well be a major factor behind his selection.

As the senior uniformed advisor to the President and his national security team, Dempsey will bring considerable experience on operations in the Middle East and Iraq. As one who advised for a surge in boots on the ground, he is not seen as one who will easily advocate reducing force strength in Iraq or Afghanistan.

However, it’s important to view the influence of Dempsey’s new role as Chair of the JCS. Following the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not have operational command authority, neither individually nor collectively, as the chain of command goes from the President to the Secretary of Defense, and from the Secretary of Defense to the Commanders of the Combatant Commands.

Consequently, although he will advise Obama on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the commander of the US Central Command (CENTCOM) will carry out the operations and through the Secretary of Defense will provide a great deal of advice on what Obama should do. It could be argued, therefore, that Marine General James Mattis (CENTCOM Commander) will have a greater impact on what occurs in both countries.

Dempsey will also have other qualified advisors on the national security team that he will have to compete with. General Petraeus is scheduled to retire in September of this year and is expected to be confirmed as Director of the Central Intelligence agency. Petraeus is widely credited in the halls of Congress with turning the situation around in Iraq to a “manageable occupation”.

It should be remembered that Dempsey and Petraeus come from different backgrounds. Dempsey was a product of America’s Armor doctrine and was schooled in fighting a major armored war in Europe. In fact, he was scheduled to become commander of the US Seventh Army in Germany when Admiral Fallon retired as commander of CENTCOM. The 7^th is a heavily armored command and would have fit into Dempsey’s background. Instead, as deputy commander of CENTCOM, he moved up to be acting commander and the Seventh Army position went to another general

Petraeus, however is from the light infantry section of the US Army and has commanded several airborne units throughout his career. He has been involved in nation building in the Balkans and Haiti. He has also built a reputation for fighting counterinsurgency wars by relying on light infantry, which mingles with the natives, rather than tanks which tend to separate natives and the soldiers. In Mosul, Petraeus and the 101st Airborne Division employed classic counterinsurgency methods aiming to build security and stability, including conducting targeted kinetic operations and using force judiciously, jump-starting the economy, building local security forces, staging elections for the city council within weeks of their arrival, overseeing a program of public works, interfering in the local political processand launching reconstruction projects. Since he took command of CENTCOM after Dempsey’s short tenure as commander, some admirers have even argued that he solved the problems that Dempsey caused.

These two views of the wars in the Middle East could provide for some conflict during debate by the national security team. While Petraeus will likely see the conflicts in the light of counterinsurgency, Dempsey may very well see them in a more conventional light. Who can muster the better arguments may very well have a major impact on US policy. However, given Petraeus’ reputation, Dempsey may have many more problems than he expected.

Such debate will likely come as the US and Iraq debates an extension of the Status of Forces Agreement this year (SOFA). The current SOFA calls for the withdrawal of US forces by the end of the year. However, the extension of the agreement is a sensitive issue with both sides and some action will be required in the near future.

This is where the Dempsey/Patraeus world views could come into conflict. There are currently about 47,000 U.S. troops still in the country. Withdrawal, set to seriously go into effect by late summer, involves not only removing U.S. forces, but also pulling 63,000 contractors, closing 100 bases and getting rid of one million pieces of equipment. However, the Pentagon thinks some US forces must remain in the country to provide stability. If an agreement of some sort is reached later this year, Dempsey and Petraeus will likely have a major input into the size and scope of the forces to remain in Iraq.

Given their backgrounds, the composition of the remaining forces could be a source of debate within the national security team. Dempsey might very well push for a larger armored presence in 2012 and beyond. Since armor is logistically harder to move out of the region, this solves some of the logistical effort and cost. However, since armor is harder to employ in counterinsurgency, their role within the country would be limited.

Petraeus, however, might very well argue for a light infantry presence that would be better able to engage in counterinsurgency operations with the Iraqis. A Petraeus 2012 and beyond scenario would probably be more aggressive in Iraq. And, the light infantry forces would be better able to shift to Afghanistan if necessary.

Afghanistan also presents a differing point of view for these two generals. Dempsey as current Army Chief of Staff is Obama’s chief Army advisor now. However Patraeus is the commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan and through the Secretary of Defense is the operational commander. Since Afghanistan is a country where light infantry is more effective, Patraeus has a built in edge in providing advice

Undoubtedly, Obama wants troop reductions in 2012 to coincide with the ramping up of his presidential reelection campaign. However, he will not want to disregard any suggestions from the politically popular Patraeus who continues to prefer a larger military footprint to support Afghans forces. Consequently, the reductions will be geared to seem substantial, without abandoning what has been labeled as the counterinsurgency campaign.

PUBLICATIONS

Defense Planning for the Twenty-First Century: Lessons from the Twentieth

By former Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter

Heritage Foundation

May 31, 2011

Backgrounder

As the United States finally confronts its burgeoning debt, it must ensure that the proposed budget cuts are not only sized and timed appropriately, but also targeted to achieve the desired financial objectives, without exposing the nation to unintended and unacceptable consequences. This is particularly true with the defense budget. At roughly 20 percent of the federal budget, defense spending no longer dominates U.S. government expenses, due in part to the growth of the many entitlement programs. However, as the Department of Defense (DOD) budget constitutes over half of the federal “discretionary accounts,” it naturally presents a target for budget cuts. President Barack Obama is seeking $400 billion in additional defense cuts through fiscal year (FY) 2023. This averages to more than $33 billion per year.

LIBYA: OUR FIRST COSMOPOLITAN WAR?

By Jeremy Rabkin

Foreign Policy Research Institute

May 2011

E Note

The killing of Osama bin Laden provoked much cheering -- more than enough to drown out legalistic cavils from Human Rights Watch and a variety of international law scholars (notably more in Europe, than in the United States). NATO, it seems, does not expect the same leniency toward its intervention in Libya. Though the government in Tripoli has claimed that members of Gaddafi’s family have already been killed in airstrikes, NATO officials have repeatedly insisted they are not directly targeting Col. Gaddafi. A different fate seems to be reserved for the Libyan dictator. On May 16—nearly two months after the start of NATO’s air campaign—the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court announced that he was seeking an indictment of Muammar Gaddafi for war crimes committed in the current conflict.

Egypt: A Neo-Authoritarian State Steering the Winds of Change

By Daniela Pioppi, Maria Cristina Paciello, Issandr El Amrani, and Philippe Droz-Vincent

German Marshall Fund

May 31, 2011

This report provides an analysis of Egypt’s current status by focusing more on structural and long-term dynamics than on everyday politics. As stated in this report’s title, the authors still consider Egypt a neo-authoritarian state for all practical purposes, although they acknowledge that the end of the Mubarak era might lead to a political transition in terms of a ruling coalition reshuffle or adjustments in the domestic and international balance of power. Whether Egypt will become a more representative country, however, still remains to be seen. Part of the aim of this work is to highlight some of the possible obstacles to this desirable outcome.

How to Help the Anti-Gadhafi Fighters

By Ann Marlow

Hudson Institute

May 31, 2011

Wall Street Journal

President Barack Obama and British Prime Minister David Cameron announced last Wednesday that they will not let up their bombardment of Moammar Gadhafi's forces—but that it's up to the Free Libyan ground forces to bring this war to an end. There was a subtext of impatience with Libyan efforts in official U.S. rhetoric, as though the Libyans were deliberately sitting on their hands. Try telling this to the young volunteers who are heading to the front lines without helmets, flak jackets, sleeping bags, communication gear or vehicles. "That's the only bulletproof thing I have," Lou'ai Hatem el Magri joked a bit grimly when I gave him a pair of ballistic glasses I used in Afghanistan. Mr. Magri, 24, had been a senior at Tripoli University majoring in architecture when the Feb. 17 revolution broke out. His prominent, cosmopolitan family immediately left for Benghazi, the revolutionary hub, to do what they could. Now he and some of his friends were going to the front after all of two weeks' training.

Obama's Push-Pull Strategy: How Washington Should Plan for a Post-Assad Syria

By Andrew Tabler and Mara Karlin

Washington Institute for Near East Policy

May 25, 2011

Last week, U.S. President Barack Obama gave Syrian President Bashar al-Assad an ultimatum: Lead a transition to democracy, or, in Obama's words, "get out of the way." The speech recognized an inconvenient truth for Washington: Although the Assad regime has not yet reached a tipping point like that of the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes, nearly three months of protests across Syria have shaken the Assad regime to its core. Government forces have killed 1,000 protesters and arrested another 10,000, yet demonstrators continue to fill the streets demanding the fall of the government. Assad is now caught in a dilemma: He can continue relying on his fellow Alawite security chiefs and the minority system they dominate to persecute the predominately Sunni protesters, or he can enact deep political reforms that could convince the protesters to return home but would end the Alawite-led system on which he so heavily relies. Either way, the Assad regime as it has existed for more than four decades is disintegrating.

Mounting Pressure in Arab Uprisings

By Deborah Jerome

Council on Foreign Relations

May 31, 2011

The G8 summit in Deauville, France, last week ended with pledges of aid to the Arab world's fledgling democracies of Egypt and Tunisia along with harsh words for the Mideast and North African autocracies where protest movements are being brutally squashed. Those crackdowns continued without pause in Yemen and Syria. In Yemen, more than fifty people were reportedly killed by security forces in Taiz, and in Syria, five people were killed and more wounded in government assaults on protestors in towns north of Damascus. In Libya, South African President Jacob Zuma met on May 30 with Muammar al-Qaddafi but failed to move the Libyan government and rebels closer to a ceasefire.

المصدر: مركز الدراسات الأميركية والعربية - المرصد الفكري / البحثي